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Abstract 
Occupational Health and Safety indicators, such as numbers of indents and near-misses, 
can be useful tools to manage and improve Occupational Health and Safety. However, 
under-reporting challenges the validity of these indicators. This article aims to examine 
the issue of indicator-based reporting through case studies in the Chinese chemical 
shipping industry. It reveals some economic and social factors which affect crew safety 
reporting practices and lead to under-reporting as well biased reporting. They include, 
but not limited to, crew’s concerns over their income, future promotion and job 
insecurity, the face work, solidarity among crew, and the fluidity of employment. As 
they explicitly or implicitly affect the validity of Occupational Health and Safety 
indicators, which serves as a reminder for those who adopt indicator-based 
Occupational Health and Safety management systems. They need to be addressed 
properly so that the indicators can be used more robustly. 
 
Keywords: Occupational Health and Safety management, Occupational Health and 
Safety Indicators, case studies, under-reporting, underlying factors 
                                                                                                                                              
Introduction 
System-based approach to Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) management has 
been increasingly adopted since the 1980s. It can be traced back as early as the 1920s 
in the Western Electric Company in the United States, and the later risk management 
systems in the 1960s and 1970s (Bennett and Foster, 2007). It encourages an 
organisation to go beyond compliance with traditional minimum legal requirements, 
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and as such is seen as a crucial strategy to deal with workplace hazards and reduce ill 
health at work (Frick and Wren, 2000). In the shipping industry, the tragic loss of the 
Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 catalysed the move towards a systematic OHS 
management strategy (Anderson, 2003). The International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) adopted the International Safety Management (ISM) Code in 1994, which came 
into force in 1998 for passenger vessels, tankers, bulk carriers and high speed crafts 
over 500 Gross Tonnage (GT), and in 2002 for the rest of the vessels over 500 GT. The 
main objectives of the ISM Code are to ensure the safe operation of ships, create a safe 
working environment at sea and reduce the amount of maritime accidents (Anderson, 
2003; Oltedal and McArthur, 2011).  
 
In safety-critical industries, such as oil refinery and chemical processing, adoption of 
OHS indicators, such as numbers of incidents and near-misses, is highly recommended, 
and it is suggested that managers’ incentive schemes should be linked to OHS indicators 
(Hopkins, 2009). Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that such links may result in 
managing numbers rather than managing safety (Hopkins, 2009; Shaw and Blewett, 
2000). In parallel with this argument, under-reporting is a serious issue in OHS 
management (Azaroff et al., 2002; Probst and Graso, 2013), which undermines the 
validity of OHS indicators. Similarly in shipping, the ISM code requires seafarers to 
report safety-related issues to their company, and such reporting has been considered 
as the most significant indicator of a well-established OHS management system as well 
as safety culture in a shipping company (Anderson, 2003; Ek and Akselsson, 2005; 
Lappalainen et al. 2011; Lappalainen, 2016; Oltedal and McArthur, 2011). In practice, 
however, under-reporting is a major noncompliance with the ISM Code (Bhattacharya, 
2012; Ek and Akselsson, 2005; Lappalainen et al. 2011; Lappalainen, 2016; Oltedal and 
McArthur, 2011). 
 
While the problem of under-reporting does not necessarily mean that OHS indicators 
should be abandoned (Hopkins, 2009), it is ascertained that an adequate understanding 
of the reasons behind under-reporting should be developed in order to manage OHS 
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and make the indicators more robust. This article aims to examine the issue of indicator-
based reporting through case studies in the Chinese shipping industry. The particular 
focus is on crew reporting practices as an essential part of the OHS management system 
for a shipping company. 
 
OHS indicator and under-reporting 
According to the ISM Code, all shipping companies subject to the Code are required to 
establish mandated forms of safety management systems. Regardless of the differences 
between the management systems, it is essential that an OHS management policy 
should be clearly stated at the beginning of any OHS management system. The word 
‘policy’ means ‘the general intentions, approach and objectives – the vision – of an 
organisation and the criteria and principles upon which it bases its action’ (HSE, 
1997:6). It is mainly set up by top management of an organisation, and should reflect 
the values or beliefs of the organisational members who produce and implement it. An 
effective OHS management policy sets a clear direction for members to follow. It 
should not be about ‘lip service’ given by management, but their genuine commitment 
to action (HSE, 2000).  In general, the ultimate goal of an OHS management policy is 
to maintain specified management standards and achieve expected outcomes.  
 
An OHS management policy is brief, concise and abstract, and it is embodied by actual 
OHS management objectives. In association with the objectives, OHS indicators are 
increasingly used in various industries for indicating and measuring whether the 
objectives are achieved (Buchanan and Huczynski, 1997; Cox and Cox, 1996; Hopkins, 
2009; HSE, 2000; Leveson, 2015; Mohammadfam et al., 2017; Shea et al., 2016; 
Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000). The use of indicators has been seen to be an effective 
means to manage negative events, as they are easy to measure and can serve as 
important evidence for rewards and penalties of employee’s performance (Hopkins, 
2009; Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000). Based on the indicators, it is easy to establish 
observable cause-effect relationships between unsafe practices and negative events. 
The use of indicators for OHS management is also supported by Armstrong and 
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Armstrong (2008), since it provides valuable data for cross time and cross department 
comparisons of the effectiveness of OHS management issues and helps shape a better 
form of work organisation. This practice is potentially able to ‘raise the profile’ of OHS 
management for an organisation (Wadsworth and Smith, 2009). 
 
However, it is also acknowledged that the sole focus on indicators can be narrow-
sighted, inadequate and even problematic due to the complexity of a wide range of OHS 
issues (Cox and Lippel, 2008; Hopkins, 2000; Shaw and Blewett, 2000). It over-relies 
on the safety records as indicators of the OHS management, and could lead to reporting 
biases and discourage workers from reporting safety related issues. Gunningham 
(2007:12) recognises that a formal system becomes problematic because it could not 
‘reveal to what extent near misses and incidents are actually reported, or to what extent 
or why, workers are constrained from reporting their concerns’. The research by Nichols 
and Tucker (2000) showed the common use of reported lost time injuries rates and 
award system raised the concern of creation for incentives not to report injuries. It could 
lead to the practice that ‘getting the numbers right’ becomes more important than 
improving OHS outcomes (Hopkins, 2009; Shaw and Blewett, 2000). Research has 
shown that employees and, in some cases, managers may be unwilling to report OHS 
issues in order to prevent themselves from being blamed or punished (e.g. losing job, 
losing bonus, being denied of promotion, and being labelled as trouble makers) 
(Azaroff et al., 2002; Probst and Graso, 2013).  
 
In this context, some authors like Walters (2005), and Balka and Freilich (2008) 
expressed a moderate view. While there are obviously ‘positive roles’ in using 
indicators, some limitations such as ‘underestimation’, ‘reliability of measurement’ and 
‘cause-effect’ analysis, and ‘latent conditions’ of incidents are also identified (Reason, 
1997:10; Walters, 2005:26). These limitations, including under-reporting, need to be 
taken into account when incorporating indicators into an OHS management system.   
 
In shipping, one of the key components of the ISM Code and an OHS management 
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system is reporting safety-related issues such as incidents and near misses to the 
management of a company. Based on the reporting, OHS indicators are widely used, 
which serves as the ‘barometer’ of the OHS management. As a result, the reported 
statistical information can be summarised and measured against the OHS indicators so 
as to evaluate the outcomes of the OHS management. The rational is that the shipping 
company is able to measure the extent to which the OHS management has been 
achieved. In addition, by collecting and analysing such information, members of the 
company can learn from the negative events, make more effective accident prevention 
efforts, and take proactive approach to safety.  
 
To a great extent, the use of OHS indicators depends on the statistics of workplace 
reporting. Despite the requirements of reporting in the ISM Code, it has been found that 
while reporting of fatality accidents at sea to relevant maritime authorities was 
inevitable, less severe accidents and incidents were underreported (Ellis et al., 2010; 
Hassel et al., 2011, Luo and Shin, 2016; Psarros et al., 2010). The study conducted by 
Lappalainen et al. (2011) showed that incident reporting did not function properly 
within the Finnish maritime industry. Hassel et al. (2011) analysed accident data 
between 2005 and 2009 from the IHS FairPlay and the maritime authorities of seven 
flag states and it showed that only about half of the accidents experienced were reported. 
In general, the literature suggests that underreporting is a ‘considerable problem’ in this 
industry, and ‘a culture of underreporting’ of safety related occurrences is prevalent 
(Ellis et al., 2010; IMO, 2008; Oltedal and McArthur, 2011).  
 
Factors affecting underreporting vary. Van Der Schaaf and Kanse (2004) conducted a 
cross-industrial review and drew out several barriers to reporting on an individual level. 
They include: (1) fear of disciplinary action or embarrassment; (2) risk acceptance, 
because incidents are regarded as part of the job; (3) reporting is regarded as useless as 
reports are not acted on by management; and (4) practical reasons, for example 
reporting is seen as difficult and time-consuming. The study made by Lappalainen et 
al. (2011) in Finnish maritime industry showed that the maritime personnel have an 
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occupational culture which is incompatible with the rule-based safety management 
approach provided by the ISM Code. Oltedal and McArthur (2011) conducted a 
questionnaire survey on Norwegian merchant fleet and Kongsvik et al. (2012) 
conducted a similar study on offshore service vessels operating on the Norwegian 
continental shelf. While they drew on Van Der Schaaf and Kanse’s (2004) findings, 
both studies extended to organisational factors that affect safety reporting practices. 
These factors include safety training and crew competence, safety management, general 
safety practice, feedback on reporting, and perceived demand for efficiency.  
 
While Oltedal and McArthur (2011) and Kongsvik et al. (2012) touched upon fear of 
blame, they did not explore what underpinned such fear. Bhattacharya (2011) took a 
qualitative approach and shifted the focus onto how employment relations discouraged 
seafarers from reporting. His study showed that it was primarily the fear of losing job 
that resulted in under-reporting. This fear was caused by the structure and employment 
practice of the industry which was characterised by short-term contract. Shipping is a 
globalized industry as the common practice of flagging out enables ship 
owners/managers to register their ships in Flag of Convenience (FOC) countries (such 
as Liberia and Panama) and allows them to employ seafarers from any labour supply 
countries through local crewing agencies (Alderton et al., 2004). As ship-owners take 
full advantage of the global seafarer market, the practice of permanent employment of 
seafarers has become less common and more and more seafarers are being employed 
from new labour-supply nations on short-term contractual employment (Alderton et al., 
2004). The short-term contracts are found to discourage reporting (Kongsvik et al., 
2012). 
 
Such employment relations give rise to strong power inequalities between managers 
and seafarers, which can have a negative impact on the development of trust (Cook et 
al., 2005; Oskarsson et al., 2009). Even though shipping companies claimed to have a 
non-blame culture in place, seafarers had no faith in it as the lack of long term 
employment made seafarers vulnerable to managers’ power (Bhattacharya, 2011 and 
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2012). Without trust, workers would not communicate with their managers freely and 
openly and honest reporting would not be achieved (O’Reilly, 1978).  
 
While Bhattacharya’s (2011 and 2012) detailed exploration of fear of blame goes 
beyond individual and organisational barriers and extends to the structure of the 
industry and the associated power inequality, it nevertheless focuses mainly on the 
power of managers to terminate seafarers’ employment. Arguably, this is one end of the 
full spectrum of the ways in which managers can exert power. Manpower shortage has 
been a long standing issue in the industry and recruitment and retention of qualified 
seafarers is a big concern of ship managers. Consequently ‘poaching’ of seafarers is not 
uncommon in the industry (Leong, 2012). In this context, threatening of terminating 
employment is unlikely to be common strategy that managers would use to discipline 
seafarers.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the article will examine indicator-based reporting 
practices in Chinese shipping. Considering the research on fear, power and OHS 
reporting in the maritime industry, this article contributes to this literature with a close 
examination of crew reporting practices in the Chinese context. It seeks to better 
understand crew reporting by exploring a broad range of factors that contribute to 
under-reporting, which is supposed to be properly addressed by shipping companies as 
well as international shipping industry.  
 
The cases and research methods 
The research consisted of case studies of two Chinese Chemical shipping companies. 
Both companies are located in the Yangtze delta area in China. Company 1 (C1) is 
dedicated to oil and chemical transportation. It was established in 1994 by its Group 
Company. By 2017, the company had 16 special cargo carriers, among which 11 were 
chemical tankers. C1 had its OHS management system since its establishment. The 
system was named as ‘Quality, Safety and Environment Management System’ 
(QSEMS) in line with the ISM Code, NSM (National Safety Management) Code, ISO 
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9001:2000 and ISO14001:2004. In addition, the system considered the standards from 
OHSAS18001 (Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series), TMSA (Tanker 
Management and Self-Assessment Guide) and VIQ (Vessel Inspection Questionnaire). 
The QSEMS is regarded as a ‘statutory document’ in which the company’s OHS 
management policy, corresponding objectives and management commitment are 
clearly stated. In order to quantify and measure the achievements of its safety policy, 
the company accordingly laid down detailed objectives. In line with each of these 
objectives, there was an affirmative statement or numerical value attached for the 
purpose of measurement and assessment (See Table 1).  
Table 1. The objectives of OHS management (C1) 
Safety Objective No significant accidents, aiming at zero accidents and zero 
pollution 
Health Objective Rate of casualty is zero; work-related injury <=1  
Inspection Outcome 
Objective 
Rate of ship detention by PSC1: zero; rate of passing oil 
majors inspection: 90% 
Ultimate Objective To achieve zero accidents, zero pollution through thorough 
implementation of the OHS management system 
Company 2 (C2) was established in 2004. It operated 19 chemical tankers in 2017. The 
company’s management system was named as Quality and Safety Management System 
(QSMS). The company has passed the ISM as well as NSM verification. Similar to C1, 
this company broke down its general policy statement into quantified annual objectives. 
The objectives, illustrated in Table 2, are extensions to the original statement.  
Table 2. The objectives of OHS management (C2) 
Health Index Personal casualty rate: LTIF2<=2.0; TRCF3<=4.0 
Safe Operation Index Average Loss: no occurrence of average level accidents; 
                                                        
1 Port State Control 
2 Lost Time Injury Frequency 
3 Total Recordable Case Frequency 
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minor incidents <= 2/Annum 
Machine Damage: no occurrence of average level 
accidents; minor incidents <= 2/Annum 
Environmental 
Protection Index 
No occurrence of average level pollution accidents; 
minor incidents<= 2/Annum 
Safety Inspection Index PSC/FSC 4  detention rate: zero; industrial inspection 
pass rate: ≥90% 
In C1, the crewing company of the Group Company was in charge of crew’s 
arrangement. The majority of crew signed long-term contracts with the company. The 
average working period onboard was between 6 and 9 months. In C2, the crew 
department was in charge of crew recruitment from the domestic seafaring labour 
market. Most of the crew signed short-term contracts with the company, and only 15 
percent of them had long-servicing contracts (usually 3 or 5 years). Both companies’ 
fleets were mainly registered in China. The major trading areas for both companies 
were in the western Asia Pacific region, and a few large ships were operated globally. 
Both companies adopted an index-based approach to OHS management and the 
objectives of the management have been quantified accordingly. They were referred to 
by the management at regular intervals and further compared with actually reported 
cases in order to measure the quality of their OHS management.   
 
In line with the common practice of case studies (Yin, 2009), this research took a 
qualitative approach in order to achieve an in-depth understanding of the issue. The 
field work included one researcher’s visits to two companies’ offices and sailing with 
four of their chemical tankers (two tankers from each company) for four short voyages. 
The study mainly used semi-structure interview technique. In total, 55 interviews with 
crew were conducted in Chinese during the research voyages. Afterwards, they were all 
translated and transcribed into English for the convenience of data analysis. The field 
work also included observation of crew’s daily work activities, informal chatting with 
                                                        
4 Flag State Control 
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them in various occasions and analysis of collected documents in relation to this study. 
The ethical approval for conducting the research was granted by Cardiff University. As 
various sources of data were converged, initial analysis of them was carried out and key 
concepts were highlighted in the text. Then, the Nvivo software was applied to assist 
data coding and in-depth analysis. As a result, some of the common themes in relation 
to this study were identified. In general, the results showed a significant gap between 
what is required and what really occurs in terms of crew safety reporting, which is 
presented in the following.   
 
Similar understanding, inconsistent behaviours  
The safety management policy and objectives were required to be posted on public 
areas onboard ships of both companies. The crew members onboard the four ships 
demonstrated a clear understanding of safety reporting policy. Also, they were aware of 
the general principle of reporting practice, i.e., ‘seeking truth from the fact’. According 
to the requirements of the management systems of both companies, crew safety 
reporting covered a wide range of OHS management activities. Each of the crew 
members onboard a ship was obliged to report safety-related events to the shore 
management no matter how minor they were – even if they were ‘pins’ or ‘wires’ for 
fixing or lashing a lifeboat, as long as they had implications for improving shipboard 
work safety. For example, a junior engineer said:  
According to the requirement (of the management system), even a tiny 
problem should be reported. Even if it had occurred today, and would be 
repaired tomorrow, it should also be written and reported. 
 
In general, the importance of making such reports was acknowledged by the crew 
members during the interviews. The following statement is given by another junior 
engineer: 
The report must be made. Self-inspection reports must be made regularly. If 
you don't have any deficiencies to report, is it realistic?  
 
Self-inspection was one of the major OHS management activities onboard a ship. The 
inspection result should be reported to the shore management at regular intervals. The 
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crew understood that, more or less, there were certain safety-related problems onboard 
a ship. In a few cases, it might be that there were no deficiencies to be identified, but 
that did not mean that the ship was perfect: 
If you cannot find out the problems yourselves, it doesn't mean you are 100 
percent perfect. If you dared to claim so, the shore management would come 
to assess and inspect ... to see whether you actually were 100 percent safe. (A 
Bosun)  
 
Thus a lack of any report of safety issues was construed as crew’s failure to identify 
safety-related problems, which further pointed to their incompetence regarding onboard 
safety management.  
 
While the need for safety reporting was understood by the crew members, in practice, 
it was found that they behaved in a different way and as a matter of fact, OHS-related 
problems were not fully reported. The interviews with the crew members showed that 
a significant number of them showed a relatively conservative attitude – only few of 
them were willing to participate in voluntary reporting. For the lower ranking crew, 
they showed a significant disinterest in reporting. They thought it was unnecessary to 
make such reports: 
The reporting is done by the captain. Whether he reports to the shore 
management, it’s up to him. The lower ranking crew would not make a report. 
It’s unnecessary to talk about this. It is nothing to do with my job. (A 
Motorman) 
 
This motorman thought the reporting was done mainly by senior officers and so it was 
irrelevant to his work. Another rating also showed an indifferent attitude towards 
reporting near misses: 
The near miss ... It didn't have any real consequences. We feel it has passed 
and there is no need to report it. What is it for? 
 
The research by Bailey et al. (2007) identified different levels of risk perception in the 
maritime industry, and lower ranking crew also showed a lower level of risk perception. 
Regarding the officers, they were supposed to be more active and were obliged to 
submit reports. The data, however, suggested that voluntary reporting was also rare 
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among them in both companies. A captain described the gap between what the shore 
management expected and what the crew actually thought: 
It is very likely they will not submit a report. They (shore management) are 
leaders and they want to know everything about us: Don't hide anything. But 
it is difficult to do as they wish.   
 
As mentioned above, a lack of safety related reports was not acceptable, however, as a 
practical solution, some crew members commented that the reporting could be done in 
an alternative way. For example, a chief officer said:  
We had certain considerations. The ship could not report all the issues to the 
shore management. Also, the ship could not report nothing. (As a solution), 
some innocuous cases can be reported.  
 
The interview data indicated that innocuous cases referred to issues of less significance 
to the OHS management. One second officer explained:  
Sometimes, if it is hard to find anything, I just randomly write something 
unimportant, for example, I find something that is going to expire.  
 
Unsurprisingly crew members, particularly senior officers, would take ‘deliberate 
considerations’ prior to making reports to the shore management. One captain talked 
about the ‘principle’ that guided his reporting: 
Basically for us, the principle of reporting is to report only the good and not 
the bad, to avoid critical points and to dwell on the trivial.  
 
Protecting self, protecting others 
It emerges the question why the crew members behaved the way they did. A simple 
explanation is that safety reporting was significantly affected by crew’s concern of their 
self-interest. Firstly, the interviews suggested that the reporting could affect 
management’s impression on crew’s performance. If many nonconformity cases were 
reported by a ship, the management might think that the ship’s leaders were not good: 
If you reported many, the shore management would have second thoughts. 
They would think that your ship had safety problems and the ship’s leaders 
were no good enough. (A Second Engineer)  
 
From the crew’s perspective, the reporting could imply that their safety management 
onboard had problems, and accordingly, they could leave negative impression on the 
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shore management. Thus, crew members were sensitive about the reporting.  
 
The research further found that safety reporting could affect crew’s income. In C1, it 
was called ‘performance pay’, while in C2, it was called ‘safety bonus’. The reported 
items would be assessed by the shore management as evidence for determining payment. 
One captain mentioned that there were often deductions from his salary by his company: 
Now it is tricky. If a problem was reported, my money would be deducted. 
Personally, my salary was often docked by the company.  
 
The quote showed that the reporting was closely related to crew’s income, which is 
likely to affect crew’s willingness to making reports. Apart from this, it was found that 
the reporting could affect their prospects of promotion. In order to be able to be 
promoted to a higher position, a crew member’s certificate upgrading exam needed be 
arranged by their company. This is particularly the case in C1 with which most of them 
had long-term contracts. The arrangement would prioritise those whose performance 
was assessed as good by the shore management. The reported cases were a key indicator 
of a crew member’s performance. For example, a second officer said:  
If your work was not done well and reported, this would affect the company’s 
consideration for the arrangement of your license upgrading exam … affect 
your promotion. They are all relevant. 
 
More directly, the impact of a crew member’s job arrangement was also significant. For 
instance, a chief engineer gave the following reason:  
If a senior officer does not perform well, it is impossible for him to be 
promoted to captain or chief engineer. A superintendent can decide that a 
person cannot be a captain on the ship supervised by him. He has this power, 
since it involves shared responsibilities.  
 
The implication is that a superintendent had the decisive power over the appointment 
of a crew member, particularly a senior officer. This means that even if a chief officer 
gained a captain’s qualification, he might not be able to be appointed to a ship as a 





As soon as a case report, particularly a near miss, was received by the shore 
management, it would be assessed by the managers in both companies. If the result of 
the investigation was judged as valuable for improving a ship’s safety, it would be 
circulated among the company’s fleet. Although this was done in an anonymous way, 
the person who caused it could be easily identified by his fellow colleagues. For 
example, a second engineer expressed his worry about the potential impact on his 
personal reputation:  
Even though the person’s name is not mentioned, other colleagues could know 
by guessing, since they would know who the second engineer is on that ship. 
It causes a bad impression on the person. 
 
The importance of ‘face’ at work for Chinese people has been highlighted in the 
literature. It is seen as a salient feature in the Chinese culture (Fang, 1999; Lu, 1991). 
Typically, in a particular group or unit, the positive sides are encouraged to be exposed 
to outsiders while the negative sides should not be brought to the public. In a similar 
vein, this case means that the loss of face would be known to his colleagues, which 
prevented crew’s willingness from reporting.  
 
Apart from the above-mentioned points, the study further revealed a strong presence of 
solidarity onboard ships, which meant that the crew on the same ship tended to protect 
each other. Therefore, senior officers would think twice whether to report certain cases 
or not when such cases would implicate their colleagues. For example, a chief engineer 
expressed his concern regarding younger crew members: 
The young men ... they are very good usually. One might show dangerous 
behaviour due to carelessness. I met this situation on this ship. Should I kick 
him out? Then how should I deal with it? Try my best to remedy the situation, 
rather than something else (reporting).  
 
This description showed a strong sense of solidarity among Chinese crew members. As 
they worked together on the same ship for a prolonged period of time, the crew believed 
that harmonious relationships were in everybody’s interest and the reporting could 




In addition, one of the major concerns for the shore management was the need to pass 
external inspections. The self-reported deficiencies would be easily observed by an 
external inspector, which could lead to further enquiry into the deficiencies. In this case, 
not only would the relevant crew members’ interests be affected, but also the ship might 
be ordered to make remedial actions, or even be detained, in which case ship’s sailing 
schedules as well as company’s business reputations would equally be affected. Also, 
it could possibly annoy management and further lead to investigatory and disciplinary 
actions against relevant crew. Under such a circumstance, a senior engineer felt he was 
placed in a dilemma about whether a problem should be reported:  
If a problem was reported, you knew it was wrong and you didn't solve it … 
not only would the crew be in trouble, but also the company would be in 
trouble. It was very easy to be identified by inspectors.  
 
Thus, it could be seen that the recorded deficiencies could affect an inspector’s 
judgement of a ship’s OHS management status. For the purpose of protecting crew 
themselves as well as their companies, some cases were intentionally excluded from 
the reports.  
 
As a consequence and in order to avoid troubles, a crew’s pre-communication with 
shore management was usually seen to be an initial step before a formal written 
deficiency report was sent. The reporting would be ‘advised’ by the manager or 
superintendent responsible for that ship regarding what and how to report. For example, 
a chief officer described the issue as follows: 
Sometimes, the superintendent hopes you (crew) to report by telephone; 
sometimes, they hope you to report by written (report). If you (communicate) 
through a written report directly, it’s very formal. This might not help us. So 
we would make a telephone call to him to report in advance in order not to 
annoy him. 
 
Compulsory reporting, limited role 
In parallel with reporting safety-related problems, reporting near misses received equal 
emphasis, since a near miss case could have the same underlying causes as an accident. 
In C1, the report was requested as soon as a near miss was identified onboard; while in 
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C2, there was a compulsory requirement that at least two near misses be reported every 
month. Meanwhile, the management systems of the two companies specified that the 
reported cases should not be repetitions of those that had been reported previously from 
any of the ships. The reason was that all ships had been informed of those cases, and 
the repeated reporting meant a lack of care regarding the company’s notifications, 
which equally meant the lack of sense of responsibility. For instance, a chief officer 
said: 
All the near misses that have been reported previously should not be repeated. 
If it has occurred once and it occurs a second time, then it proves that your 
(ship’s) management was not good.  
 
The reoccurrence of a particular case could signify a vulnerability that was more likely 
to cause an incident or accident. Discouraging the report of such cases could result in 
the company missing out on valuable statistical data. As a result of the discouragement, 
a captain commented that they faced a dilemma: 
Generally, the number of reportable near misses was reduced. We have almost 
finished reporting whatever we are able to think of, because we should not 
repeat the mistakes we have made previously.  
 
In order to deal with this dilemma, the crew members described their strategies, among 
which the following one was typical: 
We have to submit a report even if there are no such cases. What should we 
report if there are no such cases? (As a result), the only way is to imagine 
something… (A Chief Officer) 
 
In general, the response of the crew members on two ships in C2 showed that they did 
not take this requirement seriously in their work practice. During the field trips onboard 
ships, some near misses were observed and noted down in the field notes: 
It was a fine day sailing at sea. I participated in crew’s tank washing work. I 
saw deck ratings wearing only common yarn gloves. The washing required 
crew members to go down to the bottom of the tanks, which were more than 
10 meters high, but none of them wore any protective apparatus on their heads 
and faces. I could feel the pesticide-like smell from time to time… 
 
However, these safety issues, occurred in crew’s day-to-day operations, were not 
reported to the shore management. Rather, ‘self-digestion’ was referred to by some crew 
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members in dealing with safety-related problems onboard ships, which meant that they 
might not report a problem until a significant consequence occurred. For example, a 
chief officer said: 
It was rare (to report). If you reported (it) to the shore management, it would 
cause trouble. Usually, it would be digested onboard unless it caused serious 
consequences.  
 
Under such circumstances, ‘self-digestion’ of the problems only meant that crew were 
aware of them and managed to deal with them on their own. It never meant an 
appropriate solution to the problems in the absence of substantial management support. 
As a consequence, some of them remained unsolved and could pose significant threats 
to crew’s OHS as well as their working conditions. 
 
Fluid service, less caring  
It is a common practice in shipping that ships are operated by fluid crew members, 
which means that they are not fixed to any particular ships but serve different ones for 
their next contracts. Such fluidity also weakens their willingness to report incidents. As 
stated previously, in C2, the majority of the crew members were employed on short-
term contracts. They seemed reluctant to report incidents. For example, one senior 
bosun reflected on his thirty years of seafaring experience and said: 
I met many occasions of near misses. In general I would not report. We are the 
freelance seafarers. I worked in this company today, but I would leave it some 
day. Why should I care about it? It would not be reported until there is an 
accident.  
 
In C1, although the crew members were likely to be employed on long-term contracts, 
they might not return to the same ships after their shore leaves. This also made crew 
members in C2 unwillingness to report incidents. For example, a third officer from C1 
said: 
If you were only onboard for a few months, you reported this and that, wanting 
to change everything, and then you were going to leave...many people don't 
want to do like that. Next time, I might change to another ship. I would not go 




Therefore, although the crew members in both companies had differing contractual 
terms and conditions, there was no significant difference between them in terms of the 
practice of safety reporting. In general, the nature of fluidity of crew’s employment 
affected crews’ motivation to make safety-related reports.  
 
Concluding discussions 
It has been argued that OHS indicators can be useful tools to manage and improve OHS 
as they are not only easy to measure but also provide valuable data for cross time and 
cross department comparisons (Armstrong and Armstrong, 2008; Hopkins, 2009; 
Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000). Employee reporting is located at the heart of any OHS 
management system based on indicators. However, under-reporting poses a challenge 
to the validity and usefulness of such indicators (Azaroff et al., 2002; Hopkins, 2009; 
Nichols and Tucker, 2000; Shaw and Blewett, 2000). In this context, it is necessary to 
develop a good understanding of the role of OHS indicators in signifying the quality of 
OHS management and the reasons behind under-reporting so that strategies or policies 
could be designed to better contain the problem and to make the use of indicators more 
robust.  
 
Building on the previous research on why crew members do not to report (Bhattacharya, 
2012; Kongsvik et al., 2012; Lappalainen et al. 2011; Oltedal and McArthur, 2011; Van 
Der Schaaf and Kanse, 2004), this study reveals a number of economic and social 
factors to explain why they were reluctant to report. In line with the outcome of previous 
research both in the shipping industry and some other safety-critical industries (e.g. 
Azaroff et al. 2002; Bhattacharya, 2011 and 2012; Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013; 
Nichols and Tucker, 2000; Probst and Graso, 2013), the study indicates that one of the 
major factors was the concern of their self-interest which included their income, future 
promotion, job insecurity, etc. As a breadwinner of a family, an employee’s economic 
condition may override their concern for OHS in the view that maintaining family 




To a great extent, the crew’s concern of their self-interest was mainly originated from 
the management’s dominant power over crew’s performance evaluation, as was shown 
in the data. It was pointed out that the division of labour in an organisation leads to 
power differences between management and employees (Pfeffer, 1992). In a shipping 
company, the shore management, situated at a higher hierarchical level, is entitled to 
exert dominant power over the shipboard OHS management practice and crew’s 
employment. In both companies, the managers had decisive power on appraisal of 
crew’s performance as well as appointment of individual crew, particularly those of 
senior ones. In this context, being evaluated by them as a good performer was very 
important for individual crew, since it closely linked to crew’s job prospect and security. 
Situated in such power relations, crew also tended to protect themselves and their 
colleagues and tried not to offend managers. In general, this perception of the presence 
of management’s dominant power over ship management and crew performance could 
not be helpful for facilitating crew safety reporting that was conducive to the 
improvement of workplace OHS management. 
 
As a complement to the previous research, this article also revealed a few social factors. 
The study showed that the face work, solidarity among crew, and the fluidity of crew’s 
employment, all contributed to under-reporting. The first two may be more salient in 
Chinese culture (Fang, 1999; Lu, 1991). However, they are unlikely to be exclusive to 
Chinese culture, saving or losing face and solidarity are concepts also known in English 
(Bhattacharya, 2012; Rossignol, 2015). In addition, fluidity of employment is certainly 
a common practice in the shipping industry. Therefore, these findings are helpful for 
those who employ crews and operate ships globally.  
 
The economic and social factors identified in this study contributed to under-reporting 
as well as biased reporting. Given the mandatory requirements of safety reporting, in 
particular the near missing reporting, it could not make any noticeable improvement, 
and crew reporting practice remained unchanged. Thus the shore management’s 
evaluation of the paper logs reported by crews was of limited value for OHS 
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management onboard ships. Accordingly, crew safety reporting practice revealed the 
limited role of OHS indicators which could be played in indexing the value of OHS 
management. 
 
Both under-reporting and biased reporting threaten the validity of OHS indicators. 
From the perspective of shipping companies, if they are serious about using OHS 
indicators as a tool to manage and improve safety, they should be aware of the 
underlying influential factors that affect crew safety reporting, and address them 
properly. From the perspective of academic as well as industrial researchers who use 
OHS indicators to evaluate the outcome of OHS management of shipping companies 
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